This article was downloaded by: [Jeffrey Treistman]
On: 24 July 2012, At: 06:13
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Comparative Strategy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20

Home Away From Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare

Jeffrey Treistman [a]

[a] Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, USA

Version of record first published: 16 Jul 2012

To cite this article: Jeffrey Treistman (2012): Home Away From Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare, Comparative Strategy, 31:3, 235-252

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2012.691851

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Home Away From Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare

JEFFREY TREISTMAN
Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York, USA

The aim of this article is to obtain a better understanding of the outcomes of counterinsurgency warfare. It advances the hypothesis that the combined presence of a unified revolutionary force and external sanctuary will significantly increase the chances of victory for insurgents. The variables are tested against Portugal's involvement in the Colonial War, accounting for Portuguese defeat in Guinea-Bissau. The article concludes by extending the hypothesis to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, determining that the ability of the United States to succeed in Afghanistan is limited unless it seals the border with Pakistan and weakens the unity of insurgent forces.

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

Introduction

Between 1961 and 1974 Portugal was embroiled in three separate wars in its African colonies: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Collectively known as the Colonial War, the origin of the conflicts stem from the post–World War II atmosphere of nationalism and anticolonial fervor. The wars became a tremendous financial and social burden to the Portuguese government. Often referred to as Portugal's "Vietnam," the Colonial War directly contributed to the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in Lisbon on April 25, 1974.

It is fallacious to conclude, however, that the 1974 coup signaled Portugal's defeat in the Colonial War. The status of each conflict on the eve of the Lisbon coup varied and by no means was it inevitable that Portugal would have been defeated in all three theaters had the coup not occurred.[1] Indeed, prior to April 1974, Portugal's counterinsurgency efforts had produced resounding success in Angola, a stalemate in Mozambique, and embarrassing defeat in Guinea-Bissau. The Colonial War therefore presents a unique puzzle for anyone interested in the outcomes of counterinsurgency warfare. Despite uniformity in its counterinsurgency force and methods, Portugal fought its way to three different results in its African colonies. What then accounts for the variation in Portugal's counterinsurgency success record?[2]

Most studies on the outcomes of counterinsurgency warfare limit their analysis to variation present on the counterinsurgent side. In the case of the Colonial War, however, Portuguese counterinsurgency efforts were consistent across all three theaters. Portugal fought the wars at the same time, in the same region of the world, and relied on the same coercive counterinsurgency strategy in each case. Military leaders and soldiers were transferred between theaters, ensuring homogeneity in terms of personnel. In each conflict Portugal undertook psychological operations, resettled civilian populations, and sought to "Africanize" colonial forces.[3] Perhaps most important, there was no change in Portugal's colonial policy upon the transfer of the premiership from António de Oliveira Salazar to Marcelo Caetano in 1968.[4]

Comparative Strategy, 31:235–252, 2012
Copyright © 2012 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
0149-5933 print / 1521-0448 online
DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2012.691851

But shifting the focus to guerrilla tactics in order to explain the Colonial War would be equally misguided. The insurgents all embodied a mélange of Marxist political ideology and Maoist military tactics. Every guerrilla organization attempted to mobilize the civilian population, provided essential services, received material support from foreign benefactors, and pursued diplomatic engagement with the international community. In terms of tactics, insurgents based their operations in rural areas, emphasized mobility, and employed classic guerrilla methods of ambushes and hit-and-run attacks.

Explaining variation in the Colonial War can shed light on important yet overlooked factors that contribute to counterinsurgency success and defeat. In particular, the Portuguese case reveals that the combined presence of a unified revolutionary force and external safe haven will significantly increase the chances of victory for insurgents. Sanctuaries bestow insurgents with shelter as they conduct operations, and insurgent solidarity allows them to synchronize efforts in order to inflict maximum damage. The presence of these variables is correlated with insurgent victory in Guinea-Bissau, whereas their absence accounts for insurgent defeat in Angola and stalemate in Mozambique.

Studying these variables also offers new insight into the dynamics of counterinsurgency warfare writ large. I propose that insurgent unity is not about hierarchical command or the lack of fragmentation, but rather the presence of shared goals and ideology. This can explain why insurgent organizations that splinter are still able to collaborate with one another to achieve a common purpose. Similarly, my definition of an external sanctuary entails not just a place where insurgents can hide but also a suitable location for training, planning, and conducting operations.

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

Theoretic and Strategic Principles

In general, there are three approaches to countering an insurgency: population-centric, enemy-centric, and barbarism. Each possesses unique advantages and drawbacks.

Population-Centric Counterinsurgency

The objective of population-centric counterinsurgency is to win the loyalty of the civilian population. For this reason it is often referred to as the "hearts and minds" approach. Success is achieved by ensuring the physical protection of civilians while providing economic and political incentives. This strategy emphasizes the minimum use of force in order to preclude killing noncombatants. Consequently, large-scale offensive operations are to be avoided. Renowned scholar of counterinsurgency warfare Robert Taber has declared that the population "is the key to the entire struggle."[5]

Throughout all three theaters Portugal undertook civic action programs to improve essential services, in particular health and education. In some instances it granted political concessions to local communities, permitting a degree of legislative autonomy. The program in Guinea-Bissau, *Um Guiné Melhor* (A Better Guiné), was perhaps the most prominent illustration of Portugal's attempt at population-centric counterinsurgency. John Cann concludes that "on balance Portugal's social operations brought a distinct elevation in the standards of living of the indigenous populations throughout the theaters."[6]

But Portuguese efforts at population-centric counterinsurgency were perfunctory at best.[7] Military doctrine may have stressed the need for positive contact with civilians but in practice it was mere rhetoric. Cann's favorable assessment of civic action programs is therefore misplaced.[8] The main thrust of Portugal's strategy was not improving civilian life but neutralizing guerrilla activity in order to preserve colonial aspirations. The sincerity of

Portugal's devotion to the civilian populace was discredited by brutal and inhumane attacks on noncombatants. For this reason, Portugal's strategy cannot be described as population-centric.

Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

The objective of enemy-centric counterinsurgency is to disrupt the insurgent organization's capacity to operate. This is achieved by denying insurgents access to those resources required to undertake insurrectionary activities. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf differentiate insurgent resources as either endogenous or exogenous.[9] Endogenous inputs include shelter, food, and recruits; exogenous inputs consist of external support—in particular foreign sanctuaries. In this respect, enemy-centric differs from population-centric counterinsurgency as the civilian population is no longer considered a goal but a source of supply. It views insurgencies as being analogous to firms in a competitive market, requiring certain resources to remain a viable entity.

Portugal recognized the saliency of insurgent inputs and adopted an enemy-centric strategy. Its goal was to quickly eliminate the insurgency without the introduction of liberal policies. The most common method was to relocate the civilian population into strategic hamlets called *aldeamentos*.[10] These settlements allowed for more direct control over the population. The belief was that by isolating civilians from insurgents, Portugal would be able to deny the latter a crucial endogenous input. But most civilians had a difficult time adjusting to the abnormal living conditions in the camps and were reluctant to relinquish traditional tribal customs. Studies have also found that promised social services were inadequate.[11] Moreover, many residents were displaced by massive aerial bombings that destroyed farmland and had no other option but to seek refuge in resettlement camps.[12]

Despite the social animosities engendered by strategic hamlets, the Portuguese embraced them as a key tactic of enemy-centric counterinsurgency. In 1972 Gerald Bender observed that "the programs are popular with a number of military and government groups. Many argue that resettlement is the only way the military can control insurgent activities in areas where the guerrillas receive support from African peasants."[13] European observers even argued that strategic hamlets were too humane, underscoring the widespread acceptance of a combined strategy of enemy-centric counterinsurgency and barbarism.

The enemy-centric approach demonstrates that a successful counterinsurgency strategy is not contingent upon benevolence. Indeed, a "hearts and minds" campaign is a sufficient but not necessary condition for success.[14] For example, the British used population control in both Malaya and Kenya as a means of denying insurgents access to popular support and supplies.[15] In the latter instance they were particularly brutal in its application without regard to humanitarian conditions. Recognizing that Britain was successful in defeating the insurgents in both conflicts, Wade Markel believes it "supports the troubling conclusion that it is control of a given population, and not cultural sensitivity towards it, that was the decisive aspect of the British practice of counterinsurgency."[16]

Barbarism

The objective of barbarism is to destroy insurgent willpower and resolve. According to Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "Barbarism is the systematic violation of the laws of war in pursuit of a military or political objective."[17] It is often associated with humanitarian atrocities including the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants. Stathis Kalyvas has attributed the occurrence of barbarism to the uncertain security environment common to guerrilla warfare.

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

The absence of traditional front lines of battle and an inability to distinguish civilians from insurgents causes psychological anxiety. "Given such constraints, violence against civilians, including collective reprisals, may appear rational."[18]

Portuguese tactics during the Colonial War correspond to barbarism. Military forces committed a number of humanitarian atrocities which engendered outrage from the international community. Captured insurgents were often tortured or killed, in some instances beheaded. A number of reports detail mass executions of civilian populations. Portugal even assembled special commando units called *caçadores*, or headhunters, with explicit orders to slaughter insurgent sympathizers.

Portugal ordered the indiscriminate use of aerial bombings in all three theaters. They utilized napalm and other defoliants to destroy crops controlled by insurgent groups, and launched fragmentation bombs on villages suspected of harboring insurgents.[19] Soldiers also undertook clearing operations during which they would slaughter livestock and scorch farmland.[20]

Although the indiscriminate nature of the attacks caused a mass displacement of civilians and sent refugees fleeing into neighboring states, Portugal's strategy was not compromised. In fact, social turmoil appears to have actually bolstered their efforts. According to Mustafah Dhada's research on the conflict in Guinea-Bissau, many insurgents became disillusioned with the war effort and were forced to reassure civilians that continued support of the revolution was preferable to colonization. Insurgent groups feared that Portuguese reprisal attacks on pro-guerrilla villages would undermine public support for their cause rather than engender animosity towards the colonizers.[21]

The air assaults were efficacious in disrupting the insurgency, removing a key source of sustenance for guerrilla fighters. Indeed, barbarism is not without precedent. James Clancy and Chuck Crossett found that "combat operations have defeated insurgencies by overwhelming and annihilating the insurgency and its supporters through bombings, massive raids, heavy shelling, and even torture and executions."[22]

In sum, Portugal's strategy is best characterized as a mixture of enemy-centric and barbarism. This coercive policy was applied across all three theaters of conflict. Indeed, Kenneth Grundy contends that "Portuguese colonial rule in Africa did not differ markedly from territory to territory."[23] The focus was on denying access to vital resources while employing brutal tactics that weakened insurgent willpower. Improving civilian welfare was tangential to the primary objective of eliminating the insurgent threat.

Homogeneity of Guerrilla Tactics

The preceding examination demonstrates that Portugal's counterinsurgency strategy was consistent in each conflict of the Colonial War, but guerrilla tactics were equally homogeneous. Every insurgent group employed classic methods of guerrilla warfare. According to Henriksen, "African guerrillas launched hit-and-run raids and laid mines."[24] Similarly, George Martelli notes that "small bands of guerrillas, operating from hideouts in the bush, adopted tactics of mining roads and mounting ambushes."[25] All insurgent operations originated in rural areas by units that emphasized mobility and self-sufficiency.

The estimated number of actual insurgent fighters was comparable in each theater. Approximately 6,500 insurgents were active in Angola, 7,000 in Guinea-Bissau, and 6,500 in Mozambique.[26] It would be impetuous to surmise, however, that the additional 500 fighters accorded Guinean insurgents with any significant military advantage over peers in other theaters. Indeed, no historical evidence suggests that these extra forces were causally related to Portugal's defeat in Guinea-Bissau.[27]

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

The African insurgents were all anticolonialists who adhered to the same ideological framework. Norrie MacQueen observes that insurgents "appeared committed to the same revolutionary project both in pursuit of independence and in the process of nation-building which would follow it."[28] They also acted in accordance with principles of guerrilla warfare as promulgated by Mao Tse-tung. "Maoist literature," writes Kenneth Grundy, "has been found among the belongings of captured guerrillas or in overrun guerrilla camps."[29]

Guerrillas pursued diplomatic engagement with the international community to bolster their efforts. They appealed for recognition from the United Nations and sought endorsement from potential allies. Insurgent groups also deployed attachés to major cities throughout the world to advocate their cause. Such efforts appear to have been worthwhile considering that guerrillas in all three theaters received military supplies and support from foreign benefactors. Anticolonialists also received instruction on guerrilla tactics from advisors in Algeria, China, Cuba, Russia, and Czechoslovakia. Even the United States is reputed to have supported insurgents with weapons and financial support.

With varying degrees of success, nearly all insurgent organizations mobilized indigenous populations. "Students, intellectuals, and above all youths were elements of the African population that the insurgents in each colony found especially responsive to a revolutionary summons."[30] They also established coterminous social networks that delivered essential services to constituents.

The above analysis establishes uniformity in both counterinsurgent strategy and guerrilla tactics. For this reason, the divergent results of the Colonial War cannot be explained by these factors. It was not the case that guerrillas in Guinea-Bissau fought along conventional lines whereas insurgents in other theaters employed asymmetric tactics, nor do we find evidence that Portugal's counterinsurgency policy differed between theaters. Variation that explains the outcomes of the Colonial War must then exist elsewhere. I hypothesize that it was an attribute of the insurgency itself and of the environment in which it operated. Thus, I now turn to introducing my variables of interest.

Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare

In this section I introduce the two explanatory variables central to my hypothesis: unified insurgency and external sanctuaries. Insurgent unity describes the internal dynamics of a revolutionary force while sanctuaries are equated to an exogenous resource.

Unified Insurgency

I define a unified insurgency as the presence of shared goals and ideology with an absence of significant ethnic, religious, or cultural cleavages that could produce friction or outright conflict within the insurgency. These should be considered necessary conditions for a unified insurgency. Even if an insurgency avoids the cleavages that can cause significant problems, it can still succumb to infighting if members lack a shared vision of goals and overall philosophy. This conclusion corresponds with Paul Kenny's analysis in which he maintains that organizational fragmentation by itself is not a definitive signal of disunity.[31]

Group cohesion enables guerrillas to coordinate attacks that inflict maximum damage on opponents. Their coalescence ensures consistency in terms of political objectives, whereas conflicting goals afford counterinsurgents with an opportunity to drive a wedge between guerrilla organizations. A shared message also enhances an insurgency's public relations campaign when mobilizing popular support. Finally, a unified insurgent force ensures conservation of scarce resources, an important consideration given the prolonged

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

duration of guerrilla warfare.[32] Competing insurgent organizations will only diminish the potency of guerrilla operations, fostering a competitive environment for resources, including military supplies and recruits. This rivalry will often manifest into outright hostilities and open conflict. Citizens will also hesitate before giving their support to a single group, waiting to see who appears ascendant as multiple groups jockey to become the official ideological representative of the insurgency. Such pursuits distract guerrillas from their raison d'être of waging revolutionary war and afford counterinsurgents an opportunity to exploit internal rifts.

Most military theorists have long recognized the importance of a unified insurgency. For example, Mao Tse-tung advocated cooperation between all insurgent groups. Although individual units would have autonomy to execute tactical level decisions, Mao insisted that their activities stem from a shared strategic goal. He stressed that integration was key to success, declaring that "unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory."[33]

An abundance of historical examples underscore the importance of unified insurgencies. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua capitalized on broad popular support that enabled it to overcome internecine hostilities. Eric Weaver and William Barnes observe that "by the spring of 1979, virtually all sectors of opposition to Somoza had coalesced around the FSLN's insurrectionary strategy."[34] Thus, an integrated guerrilla network with coordinated operations were instrumental in overthrowing the Somoza regime. Amidst the civil war in Tajikistan the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) forged a formidable opposition to the state government and exacted a peace treaty that acquiesced to insurgent demands. Lastly, ethnic and irredentist cohesion allowed Karabakh Armenians to wage a successful insurgency against Azerbaijan. By the time the 1994 ceasefire agreement was reached the Azeri government and military were in complete shambles.

While the presence of a unified force can be a positive dynamic of insurgent strength, its absence is a potential weakness. For example, the Senegalese were able to exploit internal rifts within the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) by signing a peace treaty with the majority of separatists. Apropos the Colonial War, Portugal sought to exploit tribal and ethnic cleavages to undermine the unity of insurgent groups.[35]

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

External Sanctuaries

The current literature on the role of external sanctuaries is incomplete. Many scholars make the mistake of combining it with other forms of foreign assistance. For example, Jeffrey Record fails to articulate a precise definition, claiming that "external assistance can come in various forms, ranging from simple political support, to the provision of money, to the supply of arms, military advice, and territorial sanctuaries, and finally to the introduction of foreign military forces."[36]

Such broad definitions are diluted by the incorporation of a wide range of explanatory factors. Amalgamating all forms of external assistance could lead to measurement error. In the case of the Colonial War, every insurgent group had received some type of aid or matériel but only one colony had access to a viable safe haven. It is therefore necessary to disaggregate sanctuaries from other forms of external assistance.

I define safe havens as the availability of an external territory which insurgents utilize to conduct operations. I impose the additional criteria that a sanctuary must also be of sufficient quality. The utility of a sanctuary is negated if it is located far from its intended target, the safety of insurgents is threatened, or it impedes insurrectionary activities. External sanctuaries must provide a secure location to plan and coordinate attacks, house

the organization's leadership, and be a conduit for the transport of military hardware and supplies.

The presence of a quality sanctuary is a critical factor in predicting the outcome of insurgent warfare. A U.S. Army War College report found "the likelihood that an insurgency will succeed increases significantly if it can gain sanctuary in neighboring states and obtain assistance from state and non-state actors."[37] Similarly, the U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual declares that "access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies."[38]

The eradication of external safe havens is consistent with an enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency. Considered an exogenous input, their removal is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful outcome.[39] According to Charles Wolf, "In all cases where counterinsurgency efforts are generally considered to have been effective, there was either no contiguous land border (e.g., the Philippines) or the border was substantially closed off (e.g., Malaya and Greece)."[40] To be fair, guerrilla forces in the Colonial War acknowledged that sanctuaries can be advantageous but not mandatory. Moreover, many insurgents believed it better to operate *within* the country as a means of legitimizing their revolutionary rhetoric and mobilizing support.[41]

Vietnam furnishes a salient historical example of the value of external safe havens. During the first Indochina War with France, China converted its adjacent territory into an area devoted to training and resupply. The North Vietnamese Army would later utilize Laos and Cambodia for similar purposes during its war with the United States. The French experience in Algeria is yet another example of the importance of sanctuaries. France had been largely successful in neutralizing the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria during the initial phases of the war but momentum shifted to the insurgents once they began using Tunisia as a safe haven.[42] Having deployed 80,000 troops along the border to stymie FLN movements the French clearly regarded the Tunisian sanctuary as a viable threat. British officials also stressed the importance of impregnable borders as a factor in defeating insurgents during the Malayan Emergency. Even today, Israel is cognizant of the importance of precluding territorial access by enemy elements. Since erecting a security barrier in the West Bank the number of suicide bombings has declined dramatically. Indeed, the terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad has publicly acknowledged that the wall has thwarted attempts to strike within Israel.[43]

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

Portuguese Colonial War

The existing literature is unanimous in accepting the 1974 coup in Lisbon as the ultimate determinant of Portugal's defeat in the Colonial War. But such conclusions are specious as the status of each conflict differed on the eve of the revolution. This article therefore advances a novel approach to studying the Colonial War by assessing the outcomes *prior* to the 1974 coup.

Coding the Outcomes

Most scholars agree that by April 1974 Portugal had succeeded in neutralizing the Angolan insurgency but was roundly defeated in Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, Mozambique is a rather contentious matter and a vast spectrum of opinions are represented in the literature. Some analysts contend that Portugal had thoroughly decimated guerrilla forces, while others retort that insurgents were on the verge of victory.

Given that neither side had the upper hand in the conflict, Mozambique was a stalemate prior to the 1974 coup in Lisbon. This conservative estimation reflects the majority of scholarly judgements. Citing Lawrence Graham's study of the Portuguese military, James Fearon and David Laitin observe that "most military analyses conclude that the Portuguese army had won the war in Angola and sustained a booming economy. Mozambique was less successful from a military standpoint, but not a failure. Only in Guinea-Bissau was the military situation hopeless."[44] Likewise, MacQueen defers to the Portuguese Air Force commander in Mozambique, General Diogo Neto, "who concluded that the war had been unwinnable by either side at the time of the coup and was likely to slump into stalemate."[45] The historical record clearly demonstrates that Portugal was never able to permanently extirpate insurgent elements.

Unified Insurgency

What is most striking about the Colonial War is that only one conflict witnessed a single cohesive guerrilla movement. Guinea-Bissau's African Party for the Independence of Guiné and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was a formidable organization. Formed in 1956, PAIGC became a prominent anticolonial movement after taking part in several landmark political protests. The party carefully formulated its ideology, systematically disseminated its propaganda, and sought to incorporate all aspects of Guinean society. Grundy contends that PAIGC "managed convincingly to build a united and disciplined movement out of traditionally fragmented, disparate, and even in some cases hostile peoples."[46] Additionally, MacQueen has concluded that "the dominance of a single movement pursuing a strategy based on relatively clear politico-military precepts gave a cohesion to the armed struggle in Guiné which was absent elsewhere."[47] To be sure, PAIGC's leader, Amílcar Cabral, structured the organization to ensure ideological cohesion.

This is not to suggest that PAIGC was devoid of internal squabbles, but simply not to the degree found among insurgent organizations in other theaters. Party leaders were ruthless in their insistence that members be loyal to the movement and would execute those accused of infidelity. This naturally engendered discontentment among party ranks. The circumstances surrounding the assassination of Amílcar Cabral remain cloaked in mystery and some speculate that internal dissidents were to blame. But the organization survived the fiasco and transition of leadership occurred without further incident.[48] The PAIGC remained a unified organization throughout the Colonial War. By 1973 a United Nations committee concluded that PAIGC should be recognized as the official representative body of Guinea-Bissau.

In Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) derived its membership primarily from urban elites.[49] The limited diversity, however, would restrict its ability to garner external support and recruit potential cadres. Meanwhile, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was the culmination of organizational changes that sought to advertise its diverse membership but in reality was quite homogenous. The military strength and internal resolve of both organizations experienced a high degree of fluctuation during the course of the war. Leadership coups and infighting compelled some factional elements to try to establish their own splinter groups. Outright conflict between all guerrilla movements would be the most detrimental factor to anticolonial efforts. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), for example, would devote itself entirely to combat against the MPLA with Portugal's blessing.

The principle guerrilla movement in Mozambique was the Liberation Front (FRELIMO), but its origins were not indigenous and instead an amalgamation of preexisting

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

organizations led by expatriates. As might be expected, the contrived formation of FRELIMO would undermine the group's solidarity. Internal feuding and animosity among its leadership would ultimately culminate in open warfare against one another. Tensions were exasperated during the interregnum following the assassination of the group's president, Eduardo Mondlane. Dissension led to the collapse of the triumvirate that assumed control of FRELIMO following Mondlane's death and defectors would join the Mozambican Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), a rival organization that also conducted guerrilla operations.

External Sanctuaries

Although present in all three theaters, only in Guinea-Bissau did sanctuaries satisfy the criteria of sufficient quality. Senegal and Guinea-Conakry served an integral role for insurgent campaigns in Guinea-Bissau. Amílcar Cabral conducted PAIGC operations in both countries, mobilizing forces and formulating the organization's ideology.[50] He also sought to "import arms into Conakry and establish supply lines to the PAIGC strongholds in the southern littoral."[51] Indigenous populations in the vicinity of the border were sympathetic to the insurgents and their countenance facilitated crossborder movements. According to Dhada, "The radical socialist regime of Guinea-Conakry, headed by President Sekou Touré, provided substantial support for the PAIGC struggle down to independence in 1974."[52] A similar dynamic existed in northern Guiné, where insurgents were able to use Senegal as a base for resupply and execute crossborder raids.

The Portuguese General António de Spínola and his predecessor Arnaldo Schultz were both intent on occluding access to neighboring territories. Spínola ordered the borders to be heavily mined while Schultz is reported to have declared: "Seal off the borders, starve them out or blitz the hell out of them."[53] But such endeavors proved futile as guerrillas continued to target Portuguese troops and evade counterattacks by quickly withdrawing back into Conakry. The dense jungle canopy along the border hindered any attempt to root out PAIGC forces. Portugal's frustration boiled over in December 1970 when it expanded its war efforts by invading Conakry in attempt to rescue Portuguese POWs and eradicate PAIGC elements.[54] Known as Operation Green Sea, it was a poorly executed operation that yielded only mixed results and was denounced by the United Nations.

There were two distinct safe havens in the Angolan conflict but both were of insufficient quality. In the northern front, the MPLA took refuge in Congo-Brazzaville after being expelled from Congo-Léopoldville.[55] Their new position imposed logistical limitations that prevented the MPLA from conducting operations in Angola proper and instead resorted to launching attacks in the Cabinda enclave. Although the incursions boosted the morale and stature of MPLA, their efforts yielded no significant military achievements.

Insurgent operations along the eastern front of Angola were supported by safe havens in Zambia but the vast geographic distance rendered any such sanctuary as irrelevant. Guerrilla forces were obliged to traverse long distances that overextended supply lines and jeopardized the physical safety of soldiers.[56] In a symbolic gesture the MPLA would declare eastern portions of Angola as liberated zones but the motion was inconsequential considering that the region was sparsely populated. The Portuguese were so indifferent to the eastern theater that they referred to the region as *Terras do Fim do Mundo* (Lands of the End of the World).[57]

External safe havens in Mozambique had less to do with military operations than political necessity. The fractured nature of the revolutionary movement compelled rival leaders to seek refuge in neighboring states, specifically Zambia and Tanzania. But it

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

would be Tanzania that was of greater concern to Portugal. FRELIMO had established guerrilla positions along the border and trained soldiers in Tanzania.

Portugal would launch Operation Gordian Knot, one of the largest campaigns throughout the Colonial War, in an attempt to neutralize enemy forces in the north and seal the border with Tanzania. Upon destroying insurgent bases and securing weapons caches the immediate outcome of the campaign was deemed a success and FRELIMO would never be able to regain offensive momentum during the remainder of the war. According to Grundy, the operation had "successfully cleared large areas of Mozambique and silenced FRELIMO guerrillas effectively in many areas."[58] An associated campaign, Operation Frontier, was undertaken with the explicit objective of sealing the border with Tanzania and was also declared a success.[59]

The Tanzanian safe haven was never of sufficient quality. FRELIMO's Tanzanian operations faced several revolts in response to their austere authority. For example, recruits in Tanzania mutinied against draconian organizational policies. In reaction to internal ethnic divisions, militants belonging to the Makonde ethnic group raided FRELIMO's Tanzanian offices. Above all, the sanctuary failed to be a secure location to house the organization's leadership given that Mondlane was assassinated in Dar es Salaam.[60]

In sum, Guinea-Bissau was the only theater in the Colonial War with a unified insurgency that had access to a viable safe haven. Amílcar Cabral maintained strict organizational discipline over the PAIGC and was supported by both Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. These factors greatly enhanced their probability of success. On the other hand, guerrillas in both Angola and Mozambique were fraught with internal divisions and denied quality sanctuary in neighboring territories. The inability to overcome such obstacles diminished the potency of insurgent operations and precipitated their defeat.

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

Contemporary Applications

Contemporary examples constitute a genuine test of the predictive power of insurgent solidarity and sanctuaries in guerrilla warfare. The United States faces defeat in Afghanistan unless it undertakes proactive measures to weaken the unity of guerrilla fighters and impede access to external safe havens in Pakistan.

Iraq

Iraq has a high degree of fragmentation among insurgent groups, with Sunni and Shia extremists competing against one another for supremacy. The Sunni insurgency consists of a mixed bag of opposition elements: Baath party loyalists, al Qaeda, nationalists, unemployed young males, and the generally disenfranchised. These disparate groups maintain conflicting goals of regaining political power, imposing an Islamic caliphate in Iraq, or seeking greater participation in the economy.

Shia extremists are better characterized as militias affiliated with political parties rather than insurgents seeking to overthrow the government. Regardless, the U.S. Defense Department has acknowledged that Shia militias can undermine the security environment: "Even if they do not take up arms against the government, militias can pose a long-term challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the central government."[61] The most prominent organizations are the Badr Corps and Jaysh al-Mahdi, which have carried out heinous attacks against Sunnis and Coalition forces. Shia militias also attack one another as they vie for political influence. Their actions provoke sectarian conflict and fuel the insurgency.

Iraq is a hallmark example of a fragmented insurgency. Animosity between the various groups erupted into open conflict, teetering on the brink of civil war. Polarization among all groups engendered fierce sectarian violence. In December 2006, ethno-sectarian violence reached a peak of nearly 2,100 deaths.[62] It is therefore safe to conclude that the Iraq war is devoid of insurgent unity. The various organizations lack shared goals and are plagued by internal cleavages. Internecine hostilities have reduced the overall strength of the insurgency.

Iran and Syria are the two sanctuaries of concern in the Iraq war. Although precise estimates are lacking, Tehran has provided Shia militias with military hardware and trained guerrilla fighters in Iran. The United States responded by building military outposts along the Iranian border to occlude smuggling routes and have subsequently observed a significant decrease in the amount of aid given to Shia militias.[63] Most militia leaders also enjoy de facto immunity from prosecution and are free to move about Iraq without the need of a protective sanctuary. The Iranian safe haven therefore assumes only a minor role in the war.[64]

Meanwhile, Syria has been the main conduit of support for the Sunni insurgency. But with the exception of temporary porosity the Iraqi borders are now largely secure. In 2007 an estimated 80–90 foreigners illegally crossed into Iraq every month to support the insurgency, but by 2009 this number decreased to 10–20 per month.[65] Much of the success is attributed to the Syrian government which imposed restrictions on crossborder movements.

External sanctuaries in the Iraq war are inconsequential or their utility sufficiently reduced. In both instances the flow of military supplies has been curtailed. Insurgents based their operations within Iraq and were unable to utilize safe havens to plan or coordinate activities.

With the conclusion of official combat operations in August 2010, Iraq can arguably be coded as a counterinsurgent victory. In terms of quantifiable indicators, the estimated number of civilian casualties decreased from a peak of 34,500 in 2006 to 2,500 in 2010.[66] Similarly, the number of insurgent attacks decreased from a peak of nearly 1,800 per week in 2007 to approximately 150 per week in 2010.[67] As illustrated above, the absence of insurgent solidarity and external sanctuaries are associated with the outcome. But to be fair, many other factors may have contributed to the outcome. The United States' injection of more than 20,000 additional troops during the "surge" provided a modicum of stability. Additionally, Muqtada al-Sadr ordered a self-imposed ceasefire that reduced the amount of violence perpetuated by Shia militias. Sunni tribes also denounced the insurgency and began cooperating with the Government of Iraq and Coalition forces in what became known as the "awakening," or *sahwat*. This deprived al Qaeda of a crucial endogenous resource and precipitated the group's disintegration.

Afghanistan

Contrary to Iraq, Afghanistan contains an exceptionally unified insurgent force with prodigious freedom of movement into and out of Pakistan. The Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami, al Qaeda, and the Haqqani network are all motivated by similar goals and overall philosophy. Reports indicate that "rival militant organizations on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increasingly been teaming up in deadly raids . . . Insurgent factions now are setting aside their historic rivalries to behave like 'a syndicate,' joining forces in ways not seen before."[68] They also share an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam. According to Seth Jones, "The similar ideologies of the Taliban, al Qaida, and Hizb-i-Islami allowed these

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

groups to gain support from abroad."[69] The Afghan insurgency is thus characterized by an absence of internal rifts and fratricidal conflict. It must be acknowledged, however, that potential fault lines do exist among insurgents. The most probable divide would be between the Taliban's ideological leadership based in Pakistan and foot soldiers in Afghanistan who harbor more nationalistic motivations. Additionally, for several years reports have suggested that the Taliban was seeking to break from its al Qaeda ally. But neither scenario has come to fruition and the insurgency remains unified. Meanwhile, experts believe the probability of negotiating with individual elements of the insurgency as a means of exploiting internal fissures remains low.[70]

Every guerrilla organization in the Afghanistan war has obtained sanctuary in Pakistan. According to Jones, "The Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami, al-Qaida, and Jalaluddin Haqqani's network [have] enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan."[71] Thomas Johnson and M. Chris Mason have also found that "cross-border operations from Pakistan are commonplace."[72] Others have observed that insurgents "have begun granting one another safe passage through their areas of control in Afghanistan and Pakistan, sharing new recruits and coordinating their propaganda responses to American and allied actions on the ground."[73]

In Pakistan the various insurgent organizations are able to recruit potential cadres, secure financial support, wage their propaganda campaign, and plan and coordinate military operations. Pakistan's military and intelligence agency are reported to have aided and abetted insurgents by providing military supplies, training, and other support. Pakistan is also notorious for housing the insurgency's leadership.[74]

The outcome of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen but the prospects of a counterinsurgency victory are poor. The estimated number of civilian casualties has increased from approximately 950 in 2006 to 2,421 in 2010.[75] The number of insurgent attacks has also increased from roughly 50 per week in 2004 to 700 per week by the end of 2010.[76] If Iraq can be deemed a victory for the counterinsurgents and Afghanistan a loss, then such outcomes further substantiate my hypothesis.

Policy Implications

The United States should take into consideration Portugal's experience in conducting counterinsurgency operations. As Table 1 indicates, the combined presence of a unified revolutionary force and external safe haven are associated with counterinsurgent defeat, whereas their absence is associated with either victory or stalemate.

Table 1
Outcomes vis-à-vis Counterinsurgents

	Unified Insurgency	External Sanctuary	Outcome
Portugal			
Angola	No	No	Win
Guinea-Bissau	Yes	Yes	Loss
Mozambique	No	No	Draw
United States			
Afghanistan	Yes	Yes	?
Iraq	No	No	Win

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

My findings contrast with prevailing explanations of counterinsurgency outcomes. For example, Arreguín-Toft argues that strategic interactions dictate outcomes.[77] In other words, the respective strategies that each combatant chooses to implement will determine who wins and loses. In the Colonial War, however, Portugal employed the same coercive strategy against a weak guerrilla actor but with differing consequences. Meanwhile, Gil Merom points to regime type as the leading predictor of war outcomes, yet an authoritarian Portugal and a democratic United States were both able to manufacture a win.[78] The Colonial War therefore sheds new light on counterinsurgency outcomes.

By no means does this suggest that my variables are deterministic. Not all successful insurgencies are endowed with internal cohesion nor afforded sanctuary. Yet it is clear that more attention should be devoted to thwarting crossborder migration and subverting the cohesion of insurgent groups. For this reason contemporary counterinsurgency operations are misguided. For example, the U.S. has invested a great deal of effort in developing Iraq's essential services in order to win hearts and minds.[79] Meanwhile, the main thrust of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is to train indigenous forces to facilitate eventual withdrawal. Consideration of the Colonial War may compel U.S. officials to contemplate alternative strategies.

Reliance on Afghan border police has so far proven to be an inadequate policy. They are considered to be among the most corrupt and incompetent security institutions in Afghanistan. Indeed, observers argue that "Afghan security forces along the border remain a weak link in the fight."[80] On the other side of the border, Pakistani counterparts have demonstrated little desire to pursue insurgents. Although precise data are sparse, reports indicate that crossborder attacks have more than doubled in recent years.[81] The circumstances are further compounded by the existence of a "red zone," a one kilometer buffer zone along the border that U.S. troops are proscribed from entering.

Policymakers face the difficult challenge of formulating the appropriate strategy necessary to seal the border with Pakistan. Potential solutions may be found among historical precedents. During the Algerian insurgency France erected the Morice Line, a highly fortified fence along the Tunisian border. A more recent example can be found in Israel, where a concrete security wall has been erected to stem the flow of potential terrorists.[82]

But many believe the terrain along the Afghanistan border is not conducive to a physical barrier. Johnson and Mason declare that "the border is unenforced and unenforceable."[83] Yet alternatives to static defenses do exist. Although perhaps inconceivable given contemporary norms, Portugal mined the Conakry border while the Rhodesian Army declared the Botswana border a free-fire zone during the Bush War. A more viable option has been advanced by Paul Staniland, who proposes a containment strategy that combines robust border defenses with intelligence and policing mechanisms.[84]

A determined effort is also needed to drive a wedge between insurgent organizations. As discussed above, potential fault lines do exist among Afghan insurgents. The existing alliances are fluid and undoubtedly ephemeral. The insurgents are opportunistic, and so susceptible to manipulation as each group looks out for its own interests.

Current U.S. doctrine offers little instruction as to how counterinsurgent forces should eliminate sanctuaries, a conspicuous deficiency in military policy.[85] A better understanding of the dynamics of counterinsurgency warfare is required. Portugal's inability to undermine insurgent solidarity and seal borders in the Guinea-Bissau theater resulted in its defeat. If the United States wishes to avoid a similar outcome in Afghanistan then it must heed lessons learned from Portugal's experience. The challenges are enormous but the costs of defeat are high.

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

Notes

1. The absence of any attempt to investigate the explanatory variables that led to the distinct military outcomes is a rather stark lacuna in the literature. Most scholars are indiscriminate in their analysis and consider the outcome a *fait accompli*. It should also be noted that the Colonial War is neglected in the wider literature on counterinsurgency warfare.

2. In this article I make implicit use of John Stuart Mill's method of difference to evaluate the various antecedents; see John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic* (1843; reprint, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). Also see James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis," *Sociological Methods & Research*, vol. 28, no. 4 (2000): 387–424. For an excellent example of the method of difference as applied to Latin American insurgencies, see Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

3. For a thorough overview of Portugal's Africanization policy, see João Paulo Borges Coelho, "African Troops in the Portuguese Colonial Army, 1961–1974: Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique," *Portuguese Studies Review*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2002): 129–150; and Douglas Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (1961–1974)," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1976): 233–250.

4. D. L. Raby, *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1988); and Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., *The African Liberation Reader, Vol. 2: The National Liberation Movements* (London: Zed Press, 1982).

5. Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (1965; reprint, Washington, DC: Potomac, 2002), 11. For other classic studies on population-centric counterinsurgency see David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964; reprint, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); and Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (1966; reprint, St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 2005).

6. John Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997), 163.

7. According to Beckett (Ian Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, New York: Routledge, 2001), Portugal lacked sufficient resources to execute a comprehensive approach to population-centric counterinsurgency. Moreover, White settlers received a disproportionate share of delivered social services.

8. Cann insists that Portugal's strategy constituted an equal mixture of all three approaches to counterinsurgency, but there is an inherent contradiction in his conclusion. Repressive counterinsurgency tactics belied overtures to improving civilian welfare. According to MacQueen, "any expression of protest in the colonies became subject to systematic and savage repression" (*The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire* [London: Longman, 1997], 18; cf. 49). John Marcum observed that the Portuguese countered "insurgent attacks with a scorched earth program, cut a swathe of devastation around the rebellious area[s], razed villages, destroyed crops, and evacuated inhabitants" ("Three Revolutions," Africa Report, vol.12, no. 8 [November 1967]: 19). As described elsewhere in this article, Portugal also committed a number of humanitarian atrocities. Therefore, one cannot reasonably conclude that a counterinsurgent force is sincere about the well-being of noncombatants when simultaneously massacring civilians. Other scholars (Beckett 2001, 135) have noted minimal contact between counterinsurgents and noncombatants during the Colonial War, which corresponds with Jason Lyall & Isaiah Wilson (2009), who conclude that mechanized counterinsurgent forces are inherently unable to address the needs of the civilian population. Indeed, Portugal relied heavily on air support and large-scale sweeps.

9. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970).

10. It must be acknowledged, however, that motivation to employ *aldeamentos* varied between each theater.

11. See Gerald Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 4, no. 3 (1972): 331–360; and Gerald Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The*

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

Myth and the Reality (Berkeley: University of California, 1978). For a comprehensive analysis of Portugal's resettlement program in Mozambique, see Brendan Jundanian, "Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 6, no. 4 (1974): 519–540. Other historians have noted the alacrity with which Portuguese officials sacrificed "quality for quantity." See M. Power, "Geo-politics and the representation of Portugal's African colonial wars: Examining the limits of 'Vietnam syndrom,"' *Political Geography*, vol. 20, no. 4 (May 2001): 476. Beckett suggests that Portugal used strategic hamlets as a "means of control rather than a basis for winning hearts and minds" (2001, 137).

12. For example, Bender's analysis of Angolan *aldeamentos* found that "many of the approximately 200,000 Africans who returned had no other choice. To remain hiding in the forests made them vulnerable to attack from both sides, while a number of those who had crossed over into the Congo were unable either to secure urban employment or to work on the land" (1971, 338).

13. Gerald Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 4, no. 3 (1972): 337. Various Portuguese officials, however, did object to resettlements. Some claimed that relocating civilians disrupted the economy and thus Portugal's colonial interests, while others protested that strategic hamlets only engendered public animosity, which insurgents would then exploit. Although insurgents were able to capitalize on the public's vexation, Bender's research found no indication that this corresponded with an increase in insurgent attacks.

14. See Wade Markel, "Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control," *Parameters*, Spring 2006: 35–48. Wickham-Crowley also argues that "popular support is not the be-all and end-all of a guerrilla failure or triumph" (*Guerrillas and Reolution*, 86). Other critics of population-centric counterinsurgency point out that attitudinal indices cannot be measured.

15. The British also established concentration camps as a counterinsurgency tactic during the Boer Wars in South Africa. Other tactics included the eradication of agricultural crops and wholesale clearing operations. The Boer Wars are a textbook example of a highly successful enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy.

16. Markel, "Draining the Swamp," 41.

17. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 1 (2001): 101.

18. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 69.

19. Portugal also targeted social services provided by insurgent groups, including hospitals and schools. Indeed, General Arnaldo Schultz deployed ferocious air power with the explicit intention of eliminating insurgent supplies and weakening their resolve to continue fighting.

20. Mustafah Dhada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea Was Really Set Free* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1993), 33; Marcum, "Three Revolutions," 19.

21. Mustafah Dhada, "The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 62, no. 3 (July 1998): 571–593; Dhada, *Warriors at Work*.

22. James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, "Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare," *Parameters*, Summer 2007: 91. A contemporary example of a successful policy of barbarism is evidenced by Russian counterinsurgency in Chechnya, having declared an end to military operations in 2009.

23. Kenneth Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview* (New York: Grossman, 1971), 91.

24. Thomas H. Henriksen, "Some Notes on the National Liberation Wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau," *Military Affairs*, vol. 41, no. 1 (February 1977): 33.

25. George Martelli, "Conflict in Portuguese Africa," in David Abshire and Michael Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 416.

26. Aniceto Afonso and Carlos de Matos Gomes, *Guerra Colonial* (Lisboa: Notícias, 2000), 15. It should be stressed, however, that estimates of insurgent strength vary among historians.

27. I also test the effect of the additional 500 insurgents using two conventional measures of force ratio. The first ratio is ten counterinsurgents per every guerrilla (10:1), but Portugal failed to achieve this ratio in all three theaters. The second ratio is 20 counterinsurgents per every 1,000 civilians (20:1,000), however, Portugal easily surpassed this ratio in Guinea-Bissau and still lost the

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

war. Therefore, force ratios cannot account for the different outcomes of the Colonial War. Data on Portuguese forces obtained from *Resenha Histórico-Militar Das Campanhas De África: 1961–1974*. 2a. ed. (Lisboa: EME, CECA, 1988).

28. Norrie MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*, 56.

29. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa*, 54.

30. Thomas H. Henriksen, "People's War in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3 (September 1976): 383.

31. See Paul Kenny, "Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma," *International Studies Review*, vol. 12, no. 4 (2010): 533–555. Kenny's article is a valuable contribution to counterinsurgency literature that introduces a nuanced understanding of the internal dynamics of insurgencies. On the other hand, Kenny imposes a far more restrictive definition that emphasizes organizational leadership and centralized command. He seems to discount the notion that an insurgency can be an amorphous amalgam of discrete entities. Instead, I contend that a unified insurgency need not be hierarchical nor centrally led. For example, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White argue that the Sunni insurgency in Iraq is "not organized in a strict hierarchy" ("Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency," Military Review [May–June 2006]: 37). A networked insurgency can maintain both structural integrity and cohesion in the absence of strict command.

32. According to Robert Taber, "Revolutionary wars are generally, of necessity, wars of long duration" (*War of the Flea*, 39).

33. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerilla Warfare* (New York: Classic House, 2009), 5. For a more comprehensive analysis of Mao's strategic formulation see, for example, Shanti Swarup, "Essentials of Mao's Strategy, 1927–34," *International Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4 (1963): 401–423.

34. Eric Weaver and William Barnes, "Opposition Parties and Coalitions," in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Revolution & Counterrevolution in Nicaragua*, (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 122. Also noteworthy is that FSLN utilized external safe havens for training and distribution of military hardware.

35. According to MacQueen, psychological warfare was employed in order to "open and maintain social and ethnic divisions among the nationalists" (*The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*, 36). James Dodson has also noted that "Portugal has sought to exploit tribal antagonisms" ("Dynamics of Insurgency in Mozambique," *Africa Report,* vol. 12, no. 8 [November 1967]: 55).

36. Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2007), 24. Also see Jeffrey Record, "External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success," *Parameters*, Autumn 2006: 36–49. Daniel Byman et al. also offer an exhaustive enumeration of potential variables of external support; see Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).

37. Marc Jamison, *Sanctuaries: A Strategic Reality, An Operational Challenge* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 5.

38. United States Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, No. 3–24 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007), 28.

39. Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 40. They also argue that a "successful counter-rebellion has always required either the absence of significant external support (for example, the Philippines and Malaya) or the shutting off of such support (Greece and Algeria)" (40). Also see Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010).

40. Charles Wolf, Jr., *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1965), 20.

41. See, for example, Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., *The African Liberation Reader, Vol. 3: The Strategy of Liberation* (London: Zed Press, 1982), 146. Insurgents also believed that an indigenous insurgency would afford a tactical advantage.

42. Record observes that "Tunisia became the FLN's main operating base. It encamped on the Tunisian side of the Algerian border, armed and trained its forces there, and then launched raids into Algeria" ("External Assistance", 46).

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

43. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, *Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends* (March 2007).

44. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Portugal" (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 17 June 2005), 17. See also Lawrence Graham, *The Portuguese Military and the State: Rethinking Transitions in Europe and Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1993).

45. MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*, 125.

46. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa*, 99.

47. MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*, 37.

48. Dhada concludes that Cabral's death "had no adverse effect on the PAIGC" (*Warriors at work*, 129).

49. "These urban roots," observes Cann, "were composed largely of *mestiços* or mixed-raced peoples, who controlled the party" (John Cann, "The Artful Use of National Power: Portuguese Angola [1961–1974]," *Smart Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 22, no. 1 [March 2011]: 202).

50. It should be noted, however, that at every opportunity Cabral sought to maintain the homegrown semblance of the PAIGC and would relocate operations in Guiné when the opportunity presented itself.

51. Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 14.

52. Dhada, "The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered," 574n.

53. Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 36.

54. For a more thorough analysis see, for example, John Cann, "Operation *Mar Verde*, the Strike on Conakry, 1970," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Winter 1997): 64–81.

55. Grundy (1971) observes that UPA guerrilla activities dissipated once Congolese support was constricted, thereby underscoring the importance of external sanctuaries for insurgents.

56. The terrain was consistent with Robert Jervis's study of geographical implications for offense-defense superiority. According to Jervis, "Anything that increases the amount of ground the attacker has to cross, or impedes his progress across it, or makes him more vulnerable while crossing, increases the advantage accruing to the defense" ("Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 [January 1978]: 194).

57. The term originated among early Portuguese explorers, as the territory was largely uninhabited with less than a single person per square kilometer.

58. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa*, 103. The political outcome, however, was considered a failure. Lisbon balked at the high costs associated with the operation and had little stomach for casualties. As a result, the military general in charge of the operation would later be replaced.

59. See, for example, Walter C. Opello, Jr., "Guerrilla War in Portuguese Africa: An Assessment of the Balance of Force in Mozambique," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 29–37. The continued presence of a small number of guerrillas in the north, however, was attributed to their ability to blend in with local populations rather than crossborder retreat. Indeed, Portugal still retained control of the majority of the country.

60. Beckett also observes that insurgents "found it difficult to penetrate from Tanzania much beyond the frontier provinces" (2001, 134).

61. United States Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (October 2005), 24.

62. Ibid., 31.

63. See, for example, Julian Barnes, "U.S. Says Drop in Iraq Deaths Tied to Iranian Arms Cutback," *Los Angeles Times*, December 12, 2008. For its part, Iran may be reluctant to aid an unorganized and chaotic militia. Also important to acknowledge is that the decrease in military support may have corresponded with Muqtada al-Sadr's ceasefire.

64. I exclude Tehran's role in Iraqi policymaking, which is beyond the scope of my hypothesis. Nevertheless, many studies suggest Iranian influence is on the wane and pro-Iranian political factions have performed poorly in recent elections. Indeed, Iraqi officials have often been defiant in the face of Iranian demands. Experts anticipate this trend to continue as Iraq reasserts its autonomy.

65. Ian Livingston and Michael O'Hanlon, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq* (Washington, DC: Brookings, January 31, 2011), 17.

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012

66. Ibid., 3.

67. Ibid., 5.

68. Thom Shanker, "Rival Factions Unite for Raids in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, December 29, 2010.

69. Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 29.

70. Peter Bergen, "Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan," testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 24 May 2011). For a further discussion of the potential fault line between the Taliban and al Qaeda see, for example, Felix Kuehn and Alex Strick van Linschoten, *Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011).

71. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," 29–30.

72. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan," *Orbis*, vol. 51, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 81.

73. Shanker, "Rival Factions Unite for Raids in Afghanistan."

74. This fact was made particularly evident by the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Whether the Pakistani government was complicit in accommodating bin Laden remains a contentious issue.

75. Ian Livingston, Heather Messera, and Michael O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings, October 19, 2010); Susan G. Chesser *Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians* (United States Congressional Research Service, R41084; February 3, 2011). Note that consistent reporting of civilian fatalities did not begin until 2007.

76. Livingston, Messera, and O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index*, 10.

77. Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars."

78. Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

79. See, for example, Jeffrey Treistman, "Victory over Terrorism: Essential Services as Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, vol. 53 (2009): 110–115.

80. Joshua Partlow, "In Afghan War, Haqqani Group is 'Resilient' Foe," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 2011. For a more thorough appraisal of Afghanistan-Pakistan border challenges, see Kenneth Katzman and K. Alan Kronstadt, *Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy* (United States Congressional Research Service, RL34763; 21 November 2008) and Daniel Markey, *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt*, Special Report No. 36 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, August 2008).

81. Jim Michaels and Tom Vanden Brook, "Afghan-Pakistani Border Clashes Up; Tribal Region is Strategic Base for Insurgency," *USA Today*, July 30, 2008.

82. For a short list of other historical examples of security defenses, see Abigail Cutler, "Security Fences," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 295, no. 2 (March 2005): 40.

83. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 68.

84. Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005–06): 21–40.

85. For a more thorough critique, see Marc Jamison, *Sanctuaries*.

Downloaded by [Jeffrey Treistman] at 06:13 24 July 2012