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Social Exclusion and Political Violence: Multilevel Analysis of the Justification of Terrorism

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ABSTRACT

Research on the causes of terrorism tends to focus on broad national-level trends without examining how such factors influence individuals and their propensity for political violence. Meanwhile, theories of radicalization have yielded important insight on how individuals embrace terrorism, but the transformation does not occur within a vacuum divorced from contextual factors. This article is therefore an attempt to bridge macro-micro linkages to better understand the causes of terrorism, and focuses on levels of socio-political exclusion within a country. Using multilevel analysis, the article finds a consistently positive relationship between levels of social exclusion and individual support for terrorism. The results help capture the multidimensional nature of the causes of terrorism and better informs counterterrorism policymaking.

Terrorism and support for political violence is often attributed to a perceived economic or political grievance. Individuals may feel some sort of injustice when their social group is targeted or discriminated against by others, or believe themselves to be deprived relative to their peers. Other individuals are driven to violence as a result of deep-seated alienation and may feel disenfranchised from the wider society in which they live. Social strains resulting from economic transitions, rapid urbanization, or the breakdown of traditional societal structures have long been regarded as conditions that foster discontentment and increase the propensity for political violence. Some scholars also point to broad national political factors such as regime type or the level of economic development in order to account for rates of terrorism within a country.

Although such hypotheses have been insightful, salient limitations prevent a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that lead individuals to support terrorism as a means of achieving political objectives. Broad national measures such as the level of democracy in a country do not provide any insight as to the opinions or beliefs of individual citizens. Meanwhile, individual-level psychological theories of radicalization are often devoid of robust empirical support and limited to a small number of case studies. Indeed, Michael Jensen, Anita Seate, and Patrick James have pointed out that a "large portion of radicalization research has remained theoretical and the field has produced relatively few robust conclusions on which to base policy recommendations or new research."[1]

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More promising scholarship has theorized the implication of perceived group-based exclusion within the context of structural factors. It explicitly recognizes the potential causal linkage between an individual, group, and the state. This research program constitutes an important advancement over alternative approaches that rarely consider the intersection between broad national trends and individual beliefs, with macro and micro-level studies coexisting without consideration of causal linkages between the two levels of analysis. As Marc Hutchison argues, existing studies "generally ignore the multilevel nature of the data inherent in the theoretical descriptions and, as a result, are exposed to a number of methodological biases, including ecological inference."[2]

This article is therefore an attempt to advance existing theories that bridge macro-micro linkages by evaluating the causal effect of contextual factors on individual beliefs regarding the justification of terrorism. My analysis explicitly recognizes the hierarchical nature of global society such that individuals are nested within countries and responsive to national-level trends. I conduct a more rigorous empirical test of the hypothesis that socio-political exclusion and inequalities between groups provide greater explanatory leverage on individual support for terrorism. To the best of knowledge, this article constitutes the first attempt to investigate this relationship utilizing multilevel analysis.

I employ a cross-national comparative approach that combines individual-level survey data from the most recent World Values Survey (WVS) with country-level indicators using multilevel ordered logistic regression. A total of 66,642 respondents across 46 countries between the years 2017 and 2020 are included in my dataset. I discover a consistent positive relationship between levels of socio-political exclusion and individual support for terrorism. On the other hand, I find little evidence that the equitable distribution of public goods affects individual-level beliefs on terrorism. My results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks.

The remainder of this article will proceed as follows. First, I provide a broad overview of the existing literature on the various sources of terrorism. In the subsequent two sections I describe the longstanding hypothesis regarding the impact of social exclusion, introduce my research strategy, and present my empirical results. The final section concludes with a brief review of my findings and offer suggestions for future research.

Sources of Terrorism

The literature on the sources and causes of terrorism is quite extensive and largely bifurcated between factors that reside at either the aggregate or individual level.[3] Scholars have also approached the subject of terrorism from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, ranging from political science to anthropology and psychology. Not surprisingly, analysts have employed a wide variety of methodological approaches which has generated numerous conclusions on the causes of terrorism that often conflict with one another. In the following section, I provide a brief overview of these hypothesized sources of terrorism by focusing on both the macro and individual levels. I then turn to discussing relatively unexplored catalysts related to horizontal inequalities and socio-political exclusion.

Contextual Factors

One avenue of inquiry focuses on distinct contextual factors such as broad economic trends. The debate over economic factors of terrorism is, of course, quite contentious. A common misconception is that unemployment and poverty correlate with the number of terrorist incidents. The belief is that such conditions foster discontentment and increases the likelihood of radicalization. Indeed, President Bush premised the delivery of foreign aid on the mistaken belief that the eradication of poverty reduces levels of terrorism. "Prosperity and opportunity," declared President Bush, "help defeat terror."[4]

Numerous studies, however, demonstrate this correlation to be spurious and that poverty and economic development have little effect on terrorism. For example, James Piazza has found no statistically significant relationship between levels of economic development and terrorism. He concludes that "the relationship between level of economic or social development and the phenomenon of terrorism may be complex or, perhaps, illusory."[5] Alberto Abadie concurs, finding that "national income is not significantly associated with terrorism."[6] In other studies, the effect of economic variables are attenuated when controlling for other factors such as political arrangements, temporal contagion, and wider conflicts or wars.

Rather than focus on absolute measures of poverty and economic development as a source of political violence, Ted Gurr instead formulated the notion of relative deprivation to "denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction."[7] In other words, it is not simply poverty but the difference between expectations and reality that may lead individuals to embrace political violence. It is a subjective, rather than objective, interpretation of economic conditions. Under such conditions, terrorism is assumed to be more likely since there is a lower opportunity costs for individuals to join a terrorist organization and participate in political violence.

To be fair, some scholars reach a more nuanced assessment and find that economic factors may influence terrorism through alternative channels. Quan Li and Drew Schaub, for example, contend that trade and foreign direct investment help to reduce levels of trans-national terrorism.[8] This finding is consistent with other researchers who insist that economic development may have some beneficial effect in reducing levels of terrorism.[9] Others suggest that broader and more comprehensive economic and political developments are better poised to reduce political violence. For instance, S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory Hess include a wide range of variables into their models and conclude that "the advent of democratic institutions, high income, and more openness in a source country significantly reduce terrorism."[10] Meanwhile, Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Mogens Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen find little evidence that poverty causes domestic terrorism but do acknowledge that wealthier countries are more likely to be targets of terrorism.[11]

Recognizing the discrepancy in research concerning economic factors of terrorism, many scholars have instead turned toward political factors as the primary determinant of violence. As James Piazza explains, "empirical studies suggests that terrorism is the by-product of acute, unresolved, and poorly managed political conflicts rather that broad economic challenges, and that therefore political features of states are often better predictors of when and where terrorist attacks occur than are economic development indicators."[12]

Perhaps the most widely acknowledged theory is that different levels of political freedom influence the rate of domestic violence in a concave manner. Civil liberties and political repression can both deter opposition and incite protest. In his seminal study, Ted Gurr posited a curvilinear relationship between government repression and rebellion: "Men subject to mild sanctions for their actions are little angered by them; men subject to severe sanctions are intensely angered but deterred from the sanctioned acts and, in the short run, from retaliation against the sanctioning agents. But if men anticipate or experience sanctions of intermediate severity, their anger is likely to outweigh their fear."[13]

Some scholars have further developed this relationship between government repression and political violence by proposing the "more murder in the middle" (MMM) hypothesis which holds that semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic states are more likely to encounter violent dissent.[14] "Countries at intermediary levels of democracy," argue Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Mogens Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen "are more liable to experience terrorism than purely authoritarian or purely democratic countries."[15] The implication, they conclude, is that transitioning states are more likely to experience terrorism than purely democratic or authoritarian regimes.

A slightly different contextual factor is the impact of social welfare as a means of reducing widespread acceptance of terrorism. It is premised on the assumption that increasing social benefits increases the opportunity cost of political violence. According to Brian Burgoon, "countries with more generous welfare provisions can be expected, on balance, to suffer less trans-national and total terrorism on their soil and to have fewer of their citizens perpetrate terrorism."[16]

Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks explore the impact of social welfare spending specifically in Western European countries. They find that spending in distinct areas such as health and unemployment helps to reduce rates of domestic terrorism. "Higher social spending," they conclude, "is consistently associated with a lower level of terrorist activity."[17] According to Krieger and Meierrieks, social spending stimulates economic growth, reduces poverty, and enhances overall satisfaction with quality of life. They further reason that social spending may effectively target the demographic most likely to turn to political violence, i.e. unemployed youths.

Individual-Level Sources

Rather than study aggregate contextual factors at the state-level, an alternative approach is to examine specific catalysts of terrorism at either the group or individual-level. Recent research on alienation and the subsequent radicalization of individuals has led to important advancements in terms of our collective understanding of the fundamental drivers of terrorism.

Some scholars examine radicalization at the group-level of analysis. This avenue of inquiry may point to either social identities or organizational movements and recruitment efforts as subsequently driving individuals toward political violence. How groups interpret the world and their perception of social injustices can be a powerful explanatory factor of terrorism. In her classic study on terrorist organizations, Martha Crenshaw pointed out that terrorist groups may offer adherents a variety of incentives

to participate in political violence such that "terrorist behavior represents the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization."[18] Meanwhile, Marc Sageman and Dina Al Raffie have both found that recruitment often occurs through networks of terrorist organizations. "Transactions at the group and community level," Al Raffie explains, "foster an environment conducive to adopting violent extremist ideas and behaviors."[19]

Meanwhile, a wide range of diverse mechanisms have been proposed to account for the radicalization of individuals. Marc Sageman, for example, has suggested that a sense of moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization through networks are particularly powerful catalysts.[20] For his part, Fathali Moghaddam has proposed a more linear trajectory of radicalization that encompasses distinct stages or "steps" in what he describes as a narrowing staircase toward political violence. Beginning with relative deprivation, Moghaddam hypothesizes that a series of additional societal and psychological factors further propel individuals along the path of radicalization culminating with recruitment into a terrorist organization and committing acts of violence.[21]

Other scholars take a more critical stance regarding the effect of radicalization, pointing out the term can lead to rather ambiguous conclusions. Paul Hedges argues that factors often associated with radicalization are actually quite prevalent in the wider population and therefore do not provide much predictive insight. He contends there is very little empirical evidence of radicalization and consequently is not helpful in understanding pathways to terrorism.[22] Meanwhile, other scholars lament the absence of large quantitative studies which constitutes a salient lacuna in the existing literature. Indeed, Karin Dyrstad and Solveig Hillesund point out that few studies examine individual-level beliefs and support for political violence.[23]

Horizontal Inequalities and Socio-Political Exclusion

An alternative yet under-studied catalyst of terrorism is the role of social exclusion and inequalities. Scholars working in the subfield of international political economy have increasingly turned to studying the implication of horizontal inequalities (HI) or uneven access to socio-economic resources between different groups in a society. This line of inquiry stands in contrast to previous work that has focused on vertical inequalities, or inequalities between individuals.

Dan Miodownik and Lilach Nir advance the literature on horizontal inequalities with their insightful contention that perceptions and misperceptions of inequalities provide far greater insight on an individual's support for violence than purely objectives measures. "How individuals perceive their group status in a country," find Miodownik and Nir, "is an important mechanism for understanding support for violence."[24] Their research builds upon Gurr's conceptualization of relative deprivation, arguing that perceptions of inequality fuel grievances and subsequent group mobilization, ultimately leading to political violence.

Emerging research suggests that the presence of greater levels of horizontal inequality may increase the probability of violence. According to Frances Stewart, horizontal inequalities can "affect individual well-being and social stability" and may even lead to civil conflict.[25] Gudrun Østby similarly insists that "the focus should be on

polarization, or inequality between groups, not between individuals."[26] As a result, he finds that social inequalities are more likely to lead to domestic conflict.

While horizontal inequalities tend to focus on discrepancies in income between groups, social exclusion tends to address more political factors and the variation in relative access to power.[27] Marginalized individuals may not have the ability to leverage decision-making resources based on their identity or group affiliation. In other instances, individuals may be denied certain civil liberties or discriminated against in terms of employment or business opportunities.

To be fair, scholars who study causes of terrorism have long noted the broad impact of social exclusion and group-based conflict.[28] Luigi Bonanate, for example, described the organizational dimension of terrorism as stemming from social crises and popular discontent.[29] Meanwhile, Martha Crenshaw's seminal study emphasized the multiple levels of causation that may drive political violence. She highlighted the impact of "grievances among an identifiable subgroup" who may be excluded from policymaking processes or suffer discrimination by the government.[30] Crenshaw stressed, however, that discrimination is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for terrorism and that perceptions of deprivation must also act as an intervening variable. The impact of group-based exclusion on political violence has also been examined in the civil conflict literature. For example, Lars-Erik Cederman, Halvard Buhaug, and Jan Rød show that the probability of conflict increases with the relative size of excluded ethnic groups.[31]

Research that investigates social exclusion also helps to elucidate the linkage between causes of terrorism and the justification for terrorism.[32] Although intuitively related, the occurrence of terrorism is distinct from attitudes toward terrorism. Indeed, a number of scholars have examined survey data in order to obtain a better understanding of individual-level support for terrorism. "The *perceptions* of respondents of their status in society relative to others," asserts Caitriona Dowd, "captures more directly the grounds on which collective grievance is translated into collective action."[33] Kirill Zhirkov, Maykel Verkuyten, and Jeroen Weesie similarly argue that individual perceptions act as a significant correlate of popular support for political violence. "Subjective perceptions of objective conditions," they contend, "represent an important intermediary factor which explains how structural imbalances in world politics influence individuals' support for terrorism."[34] Meanwhile, James Piazza's study of public opinion toward terrorism within Palestinian territory reveals several attitudinal predictors of support for terrorism and emphasizes that "favorable public opinion is critical for the vitality and success of terrorist movements."[35]

Finally, social exclusion advances the existing literature on ethnic fractionalization which does not yield any insight as to how scarce resources and political access are actually distributed between groups. Indeed, Østby argues that ethnic and religious fractionalization is alone insufficient to explain group mobilization and subsequent violence.[36] At the same time, socio-political exclusion and inequalities may help better inform the political psychology of radicalization and notions of relative deprivation. As Mark Juergensmeyer explains, terrorism is frequently "associated with violence committed by disenfranchised groups desperately attempting to gain a shred of power or influence."[37] References to horizontal inequalities and socio-political exclusion may provide an operationalized measure of potential catalysts of radicalization.

This article acknowledges prior research on social exclusion and horizontal inequalities which provide a greater understanding of the causes of terrorism. Perceptions of group-based inequalities may act as a catalyst for further reinforcement of beliefs and subsequent mobilization. In contrast, individual-level inequalities do not possess the same mobilizing dynamics as individuals may consider themselves to be powerless or isolated from one another. Meanwhile, inequalities are not simply limited to income differentials, but may encompass a broad domain of factors that extend into the socio-political realm.

Research Challenges and Hypothesis Testing

Despite important theoretical advances in the existing literature, salient gaps still remain in our collective knowledge of the factors that influence an individual's support for terrorism. Most empirical studies only address broad national-level trends with few attempts to examine how such factors actually influence individuals and their propensity for political violence. Although broad trends are certainly insightful, they do not provide direct information as to whether an individual will embrace terrorism as an acceptable strategy in order to achieve political aims. On the other hand, much of the research on radicalization does address individual-level factors but is often limited to individual interviews or a small number of qualitative case studies. Although informative, such research does not provide analysts with data on broad national trends that are often referenced in the policymaking process. Indeed, Michael Jensen, Anita Seate, and Patrick James note that "data limitations made it difficult to rigorously appraise arguments about radicalization."[38]

The preceding discussion highlights the importance of research that addresses the macro-micro linkages of terrorism. Broad national trends are informative but do not provide any information regarding individual decision-making. Meanwhile, theories of radicalization may allow analysts to identify the processes in which individuals embrace political violence, but the transformation does not occur within a vacuum divorced from overall macro-level conditions.

It is essential that both scholars and counterterrorism practitioners better understand how national-level factors influence individual decision-making. Unfortunately there is a notable absence of robust empirical testing of this hypothesized relationship. Indeed, Laia Balcells and Patricia Justino have lamented the absence of research that seeks to bridge the divide between causal factors at different levels of analysis. They contend that the existing literature "has yet to consider specific linkages between micro-level conflict dynamics and wider political, economic, and social processes."[39] Establishing clear empirical macro-micro linkages can help analysts better understand the nature of potential threats and inform counterterrorism policymaking.

This article is therefore an attempt to bridge existing theories and large-N data analytics by evaluating the impact of broad socio-political dynamics on individual-level opinions regarding terrorism. In particular, I examine the impact of broad measures of social exclusion on individual beliefs and their support for terrorism. The primary hypothesis this article seeks to test is whether higher levels of social exclusion will correlate to a greater likelihood of an individual accepting political violence. Additionally, given the preceding discussion regarding the importance of horizontal inequalities and the role of public

spending, this article will also evaluate a secondary hypothesis of whether a more equitable distribution of public goods will reduce an individual's acceptance of political violence.

My analysis explicitly recognizes the hierarchical structure of global society in that individuals reside within countries and thus susceptible to contextual factors. By exploiting individual-level survey data while simultaneously incorporating macro-level sources I attempt to isolate the effect of social exclusion on an individual's opinion of whether terrorism is justifiable. This approach also constitutes a degree of paradigmatic pluralism as social group exclusion operates across multiple layers to explain terrorism: material power and social identity. Individuals that identify with a particular social group that is also denied access to public resources are more likely to engage in acts of political violence.

In the next section I analyze the effect of socio-political exclusion and inequalities on individual beliefs. I begin by introducing my data and primary variables of interest. Several empirical models are evaluated along with a battery of robustness checks. As will be demonstrated below, the results appear to substantiate the hypothesis that the exclusion of social groups increases the propensity of individuals to believe terrorism is a justifiable means of achieving political objectives. On the other hand, I find little evidence to support the secondary hypothesis that equitable public spending helps to reduce levels of support for terrorism.

Multilevel Analysis

My analysis primarily examines data obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS). The survey is conducted every five years to acquire greater insight on individuals' beliefs over time. One of the most widely acknowledged benefits of the WVS is that it draws upon a diverse random sample of individuals living under various political regime types and within different geographic regions around the world. I specifically reference Wave 7 of the WVS which includes survey results between 2017 and 2020, with sampling across 49 countries.[40] A total of 70,867 respondents are included in the WVS dataset. The complete list of all countries and individuals included in the final dataset used for analysis are provided in the appendix.

Apropos my research agenda, Wave 7 possesses two salient advantages over prior waves. First, the survey contains a question specifically referencing the term "terrorism" whereas previous waves used alternative phrases such as "political violence." Explicit reference to terrorism contains inherent normative implications and conjures extreme forms of non-state violence. This may set a higher threshold for individuals when responding to the survey. Second, and perhaps most obvious, Wave 7 provides the most recent and contemporary data on individual-level beliefs around the world.

My primary dependent variable is the survey question asking whether "terrorism as a political, ideological or religious mean" is justifiable. Responses may range from "never justifiable" (1) to "always justifiable" (10). Summary statistics are provided below in Table 1. The vast majority of respondents say that terrorism is never justifiable. The number of individuals who believe terrorism is justifiable continues to taper off as we move up the scale, but there is a notable increase in the number of respondents who say that terrorism is always justifiable.

Table 1. "Is Terrorism Justifiable?"

Terrorism justifiable?	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
Never justifiable	49,986	74.76	74.76
2	5,616	8.40	83.16
3	3,139	4.70	87.86
4	1,917	2.87	90.73
5	2,427	3.63	94.36
6	1,168	1.75	96.10
7	697	1.04	97.15
8	541	0.81	97.96
9	326	0.49	98.44
Always justifiable	1,041	1.56	100.00
Total	66,858	100.00	

I also include additional individual-level variables from the WVS in my analysis. In particular, I control for a respondent's sex, age, income, and education. The inclusion of such socio-demographic factors permit an additional test of more commonplace assumptions of terrorists reputedly being young, impoverished males with little education.

Now turning to state-level factors, the key independent variable of my analysis is the level of social exclusion within a state. Data is obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset.[41] According to V-Dem, social exclusion is broadly defined as the denial of services or the ability to participate in government institutions based on group identity. High levels of social exclusion implies limited political power, denial of civil liberties, inability to access public services, and discrimination from public employment or business opportunities. The variable is continuous from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater levels of socio-political exclusion.

My model includes a series of additional contextual variables that may also influence the justification of terrorism. As discussed above, regime type is widely believed to have a strong effect on the level of political violence within a country. I therefore include the Polity2 variable in order to measure a state's political system.[42] The variable is actually a composite indicator that ranges from −10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). I also included the quadratic term of Polity2 (Polity2^2) in order to evaluate the concave relationship between regime type and levels of political violence. For readers unfamiliar with the technique, a squared term is used to model nonlinear relationships and directional changes in a variable's effect.[43] In other words, the inclusion of both variables allows me to confirm whether transitions from authoritarian to semi-authoritarian regimes will result in greater levels of support for terrorism, and whether transitions from semi-authoritarian to democratic regimes will result in less support for terrorism.

The gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rate of a state are both included, and data obtained from the World Bank. Adhering to convention, I take the natural log of both variables when adding to my models. The intention is to assess whether economic factors have an effect or are attenuated by the inclusion of other variables. Additionally, the natural log of a state's population is included since larger countries tend to correspond with a greater propensity for terrorism.

The consideration of internal violence is critical since it may have a strong positive impact on the level of support for terrorism. I control for the existing level of conflict by referencing the CIVTOT variable culled from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset.[44] It measures the total magnitude of all civilian and ethnic

violence within a state, and ranges from sporadic small-scale violence (1) to more extensive conflicts that may result in the wholesale destruction of the state (10).

Some scholars have suggested that political efficacy or the belief that governments are an effective means to address grievances can determine support for political violence.[45] As a proxy, I reference the V-Dem political corruption index which covers all major branches of government including the executive, legislative, and judicial. The variable is measured continuously with higher values indicating greater levels of corruption.

With respect to the secondary hypothesis, scholars have theorized that public goods are a more accurate measure of horizontal inequalities and help predict levels of domestic violence.[46] Consideration of public goods also addresses the notion of "equity theory" of whether the distribution of resources is conducted in a "fair" manner. According to John Jost and Aaron Kay, individuals who perceive themselves to be unfairly disadvantaged in the allocation of scarce resources will become angry and may participate in violent protest.[47] Consequently, I control for how public goods are distributed within a society by referencing the V-Dem dataset. I incorporate the public goods variable that measures the extent to which national spending is particularlistic or clientelistic. The variable is ordinal and ranges from high particularistic spending (0) to more equitable-based spending (4).

Lastly, I include a dummy variable for whether a state is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This allows me to control for those countries that generally adhere to democratic principles, receive high Human Development Index (HDI) scores, maintain robust economies that are tightly integrated with the global community, and often have higher quality of life standards in terms of income and education.[48]

Table 2 provides a summary listing of my primary variables, subdivided according to their level of analysis. The primary independent variable of social exclusion measures group-based exclusion within a country while the justification for terrorism is at the individual-level.

I first conduct a preliminary examination of the relationship between social exclusion and support for terrorism. In particular, my initial concern is determining the degree of linearity between the two variables. It is quite feasible that each additional

Table 2. Summary of Variables.

Predictors	Description
Individual-level	
Sex	Female (0), male (1)
Age	Interval measured in years
Income	Low income (1) to high income (10)
Education	No education (0) to doctoral degree (8)
Country-level	
SocioExclusion	Interval ranging from low (0) to high (1) levels of exclusion
Polity2	Strongly autocratic (−10) to strongly democratic (10)
ln_GDP	Measured in constant 2010 U.S. dollars
ln_Unemployment	Percentage of total labor force
ln_Population	Continuous measure of total population
CIVTOT	Sporadic violence (1) to indiscriminate destruction (10)
PoliticalCorruption	Interval ranging from low (0) to high (1) levels of political corruption
PublicGoods	Ordinal ranging from high particularistic spending (0) to more equitable-based spending (4)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) membership indicator

level of exclusion may have a different impact on individual-level support for terrorism. Stated differently, a one-unit increase in social exclusion may not be associated with a constant change in individual-level beliefs, holding all other factors constant. Within the realm of terrorism research there are plenty of theoretical reasons as to why curvilinearity may exist. Indeed, as already noted above, regime type is widely believed to resemble a concave function with intermediate levels of democracy experiencing the greatest amount of political violence. Similarly with respect to social exclusion, it is possible that initial reductions in the degree of exclusion correspond to increasing levels of support for violence as individuals seek to expand their access to political power and resources, but such violence may taper off as levels of exclusion continue to decline. A Wald test of my data provides confirmation, however, that a linear model is a better fit than a quadratic function.[49]

I now turn to employing multilevel analysis in order to estimate contextual effects on individual beliefs.[50] "Multilevel analysis can be seen as a generalization of OLS regression," explain Mehmet Mehmetoglu and Tor Georg Jakobsen, "to accommodate the complexities of estimating regression models with two or more levels."[51] Joop Hox adds that multilevel analysis permits an analyst to "investigate the relationship between individuals and society."[52] This methodological approach is appropriate as my data is structured in a hierarchical fashion with individuals nested within countries.

There has been an increasing trend among scholars to employ multilevel analysis in order to investigate various aspects of political violence. For example, Amélie Godefroidt and Arnim Langer use the technique to study the WVS in order to assess the impact of terrorist attacks on levels of societal trust. They find that the fear of potential acts of terrorism erodes an individual's level of social trust.[53] In a similar study, Dag Arne Christensen and Jacob Aars use multilevel analysis and discover that fear of terrorism is more prevalent among citizens in non-democratic regimes than in democracies and, more critically, prior acts of terrorism do not necessarily impact an individual's level of fear.[54] Other scholars have also conducted a multilevel analysis of the WVS to examine the relationship between religiosity and terrorism.[55]

I begin my analysis by introducing four separate models. Model 1 serves as my simple hierarchical base model to assess the relationship between social exclusion and whether an individual believes terrorism is justifiable. Model 2 then incorporates the individual-level control variables sex, age, income, and education. With Model 3, I now begin to slowly introduce a series of contextual variables that largely focus on broad economic and political factors. Finally, Model 4 represents my full model with the inclusion of all relevant control variables. All models were run using a multilevel ordered logistic regression estimation technique, with subsequent coefficients reported in terms of their log odds.

Table 3 presents the results of my four initial models and appears to provide strong tentative support for the hypothesis that greater levels of socio-political exclusion increase the odds that an individual will support terrorism. In particular, social exclusion is positive and statistically significant across all four models.

The concave function of regime type also appears to be substantiated. Initial transitions from authoritarian to semi-authoritarian regimes are associated with an increase in support for terrorism as indicated by the Polity2 variable. Further democratization as represented by Polity2^2 then corresponds to a decrease in support for terrorism.

Table 3. Baseline Models.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Social exclusion	1.576***	1.203**	2.162**	3.186***
	(0.546)	(0.563)	(1.032)	(1.131)
Sex		0.075***	0.077***	0.077***
		(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age		−0.010***	−0.011***	−0.011***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income		0.039***	0.042***	0.042***
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education		−0.107***	−0.107***	−0.107***
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Polity2			0.071*	0.075**
			(0.037)	(0.034)
Polity2^2			−0.013*	−0.017**
			(0.007)	(0.007)
ln_GDP			0.279	0.236
			(0.194)	(0.207)
ln_unemployment			−0.458**	−0.481***
			(0.193)	(0.181)
ln_population			−0.413*	−0.383
			(0.225)	(0.238)
CIVTOT			0.012	0.051
			(0.117)	(0.121)
Political corruption				−1.696
				(1.120)
Public goods				0.045
				(0.192)
OECD				−0.276
				(0.438)
Random effect	0.509***	0.540***	0.378***	0.329***
(country)	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.105)	(0.092)
ICC country	0.134	0.141	0.103	0.09
AIC	84,273.3	81,823.5	76,924.5	76,926.9
N individuals	46,186	44,890	40,833	40,833
N countries	31	31	27	27

Standard errors in parentheses. DV: "Is terrorism justifiable?"
*$p < 0.1$.
**$p < 0.05$.
***$p < 0.01$.

The result appears to corroborate the "more murder in the middle" (MMM) hypothesis as described above. That said, the magnitude of both variables is rather small.

Two additional results are of particular interest. First, it appears that the proposition that a more equitable distribution of public goods does not have a significant impact on levels of support for terrorism. This tentatively negates the hypothesis as I fail to reject the null. Second, the model yields a rather unexpected finding that a country's level of unemployment is negative and highly statistically significant. This result is somewhat counter intuitive since we might expect that individuals would be more likely to believe terrorism is justifiable with high levels of unemployment.

Before conducting more extensive tests of the stability of my initial models, I first evaluate the potential for multicollinearity by examining the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the predictors in my full model. The results suggest that GDP is the only variable that slightly exceeds the conventional VIF threshold of ten (VIF = 10.71, tolerance = 0.0930).[56] I subsequently address this issue using two distinct methods. First, I adhere to the more traditional approach of simply omitting GDP and re-running the model. Second, I conduct factor analysis with the component loadings indicating

Table 4. Multicollinearity Checks.

	Model 5	Model 6
Social exclusion	2.674**	2.556**
	(1.063)	(1.080)
Sex	0.077***	0.077***
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age	−0.011***	−0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.042***	0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	−0.107***	−0.107***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Polity2	0.072**	0.075**
	(0.035)	(0.036)
Polity2^2	−0.016**	−0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
ln_unemployment	−0.505***	−0.497***
	(0.185)	(0.188)
ln_population	−0.137	
	(0.103)	
CIVTOT	0.051	0.039
	(0.124)	(0.125)
Political corruption	−1.879*	−1.940*
	(1.136)	(1.149)
Public goods	−0.002	−0.024
	(0.192)	(0.193)
OECD	−0.077	−0.027
	(0.412)	(0.417)
GDPpop		−0.102
		(0.099)
Random effect (country)	0.345***	0.354***
	(0.096)	(0.099)
ICC country	0.095	0.097
AIC	76,926.2	76,926.9
N individuals	40,833	40,833
N countries	27	27

Standard errors in parentheses. DV: "Is terrorism justifiable?"
$^*p < 0.1.$
$^{**}p < 0.05.$
$^{***}p < 0.01.$

a close association between GDP and population. The two variables are then amalgamated into GDPpop and included in the model. The results in Table 4 reflect these two aforementioned approaches but appear to have a minimal impact in terms of the overall results. Both the magnitude and significance of social exclusion approximates Table 3. Perhaps the most notable change is that political corruption is now negatively significant at the ten percent level.

Robustness Checks

These results, however, may be sensitive to a number of alterations. As such, Table 5 introduces my initial set of robustness checks. I begin by exploring the impact of both temporal and spatial contagion on individual-level beliefs. Previous incidents of terrorism may have a positive effect on future rates of terrorism and public opinion.[57] According to Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "A country that has experienced some terrorist incident is likely to experience more of such attacks… In addition, countries that

experience long periods without terrorist activities may continue to enjoy an absence of such activity because it can be prohibitively expensive for terrorist groups to organized terrorist activities in new countries."[58] It is also important to consider that violence can often spread between neighboring states. The probability of terrorism increases with closer proximity to other states experiencing violence conflict. "The production of terrorism in one area may provide the opportunity for groups in surrounding areas to boost their own production of terrorist activities," explains Brian Lai.[59] In other words, instability and conflict increases the likelihood of terrorism.

In light of such considerations, I assess how previous incidents of terrorism and conflict affect individual beliefs. Data on acts of terrorism are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, while data on internal conflict is again derived from MEPV.[60] In models 7 and 8, I include both a one-year and two-year lagged version of the total number of terrorist incidents in a country as well as previous levels of conflict. Interestingly, previous bouts of terrorism and conflict do not seem to have any significant effect on individual-level support for terrorism.

Meanwhile, in order to control for the impact of regional conflicts, I include a dummy variable for the presence of an intrastate civil or ethnic war. Data is once again obtained from the MEPV dataset. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the impact of a regional conflict varies by country. Some countries are encumbered by a relatively weak political regime or lack robust defenses, thereby allowing conflict to easily spill across its borders. Other countries are more insulated with strong government institutions, security agencies, and even a normative aversion to political violence that may dampen the contagion of conflict. Consequently, I include regional conflicts in model 9 as a random coefficient in order to allow the effect to vary between countries.[61] However, it appears that regional conflicts do not have any major impact on whether individuals believe terrorism is justifiable. More critically, social exclusion continues to have a large effect and highly statistically significant.

In Table 5, I also substitute variables to not only also assess if my initial results still hold, but also evaluate whether alternative measures would be more appropriate. I begin by replacing the measure of political corruption in a country with individual-level survey data. I reference the WVS question asking whether an individual has confidence in their government. Responses may range from a great deal of confidence (1) to none at all (4). Additionally, given the significance of the state-level unemployment rate, I choose to once again substitute with individual-level data by including a dummy variable for whether an individual is employed. Respondents who indicated that they are either working full-time, part-time, or are self-employed were all coded as being employed (1). Model 10 and model 11 reflect these aforementioned changes, however, both models failed to result in any significant change to my original estimations. Lastly, some scholars have questioned the empirical validity of both Polity and Freedom House as a measure of democracy and instead advocate the use of Varieties of Democracy for statistical analysis.[62] Model 12 acknowledges this potential concern by substituting Polity2 with VDem's liberal democracy variable. The resulting output indicates a slight reduction in both magnitude and significance of social exclusion, but the overall results still hold at the ten percent threshold.

Table 5. Robustness Checks I.

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Social exclusion	2.650**	3.152***	3.150***	1.716**	2.513**	1.883*
	(1.112)	(1.108)	(0.942)	(0.756)	(1.199)	(1.117)
Sex	0.077***	0.077***	0.076***	0.069***	0.072***	0.077***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Age	−0.011***	−0.011***	−0.011***	−0.011***	−0.011***	−0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.042***	0.042***	0.042***	0.044***	0.042***	0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	−0.107***	−0.107***	−0.107***	−0.109***	−0.107***	−0.107***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Polity2	0.054	0.092**	0.071*	0.054*	0.076*	
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.039)	
Polity2^2	−0.014*	−0.019**	−0.017**	−0.015**	−0.018**	
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	
ln_unemployment	−0.569***	−0.471**	−0.505**	−0.317*		−0.537***
	(0.203)	(0.185)	(0.199)	(0.176)		(0.199)
ln_population	−0.188	−0.098	−0.180*	−0.131	−0.076	−0.186*
	(0.115)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.114)	(0.111)
CIVTOT	0.032	0.129	0.050	0.044	0.009	0.145
	(0.161)	(0.211)	(0.161)	(0.113)	(0.139)	(0.123)
Political corruption	−1.831	−1.875*	−2.362**		−1.737	−1.845
	(1.288)	(1.136)	(0.940)		(1.283)	(1.276)
Public goods	0.038	−0.071	−0.006	0.163	−0.000	0.015
	(0.206)	(0.196)	(0.202)	(0.152)	(0.217)	(0.210)
OECD	−0.094	0.193	−0.112	0.262	−0.060	0.061
	(0.429)	(0.507)	(0.437)	(0.348)	(0.465)	(0.517)
Terrorism$_{(t-1)}$	0.005					
	(0.005)					
Terrorism$_{(t-2)}$	−0.004					
	(0.004)					
CIVTOT$_{(t-1)}$		0.038				
		(0.263)				
CIVTOT$_{(t-2)}$		−0.192				
		(0.206)				
Regional conflict			0.142			
			(0.593)			
Confidence government				0.016		
				(0.014)		
Employed					0.016	
					(0.026)	
Democracy						2.234
						(2.706)
Democracy^2						−3.498
						(3.585)
Random effect (country)	0.335***	0.323***	0.379***	0.286***	0.442***	0.402***
	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.123)	(0.112)
Random effect (regional conflict)			0.379***			
			(0.122)			
ICC country	0.092	0.089	0.103	0.079	0.118	0.108
AIC	76,929.3	76,928.5	76,913.5	75,116.9	76,932.4	76,930.2
N individuals	40,833	40,833	40,833	39,045	40,833	40,833
N countries	27	27	27	26	27	27

Standard errors in parentheses. DV: "Is terrorism justifiable?"
*$p < 0.1$.
**$p < 0.05$.
***$p < 0.01$.

As a final round of robustness checks, Table 6 explores the implication of a series of interaction terms. Model 13 evaluates the premise that high levels of social exclusion and transitions from authoritarian to semi-authoritarian regimes will exhibit some of

Table 6. Robustness Checks II.

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Social exclusion	2.468*	3.622**	3.188**	2.447**
	(1.262)	(1.668)	(1.342)	(1.108)
Sex	0.077***	0.077***	0.077***	0.077***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age	−0.011***	−0.011***	−0.011***	−0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.042***	0.042***	0.042***	0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	−0.107***	−0.107***	−0.107***	−0.107***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Polity2	0.047	0.059	0.064*	0.066*
	(0.089)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Polity2^2	−0.015*	−0.014*	−0.015**	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ln_unemployment	−0.504***	−0.506***	−0.496***	−0.195
	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.505)
ln_population	−0.143	−0.145	−0.136	−0.147
	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.103)
CIVTOT	0.046	0.085	0.063	0.031
	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.125)	(0.127)
Political corruption	−1.829	−1.158	−2.084*	−1.688
	(1.147)	(1.495)	(1.176)	(1.163)
Public goods	0.000	0.009	−0.018	0.212
	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.376)
OECD	−0.042	0.016		0.016
	(0.428)	(0.428)		(0.432)
Social Exclusion · Polity2	0.039			
	(0.131)			
Social Exclusion · Political Corruption		−1.906		
		(2.599)		
Non-OECD			0.438	
			(0.710)	
Non-OECD · Social Exclusion			−0.859	
			(1.382)	
ln_unemployment · Public Goods				−0.149
				(0.227)
Random effect (country)	0.344***	0.339***	0.341***	0.339***
	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
ICC country	0.094	0.093	0.093	0.093
AIC	76,928.1	76,927.7	76,927.8	76,927.8
N individuals	40,833	40,833	40,833	40,833
N countries	27	27	27	27

Standard errors in parentheses. DV: "Is terrorism justifiable?"
*$p < 0.1$.
**$p < 0.05$.
***$p < 0.01$.

the highest levels of support for terrorism. Although the test did not yield any significant change to my overall findings, a few results are noteworthy. First, there was a slight reduction in the level of significance of my primary independent variable social exclusion, however, it remains significant at the ten percent level. Second, Polity2 is no longer significant while Polity2^2 is only significant at the ten percent level, although likely due to the inclusion of the interaction. Finally, the interaction term itself is not significant at any conventional level.

In a slightly similar manner, model 14 includes an interaction between social exclusion and political corruption. We might surmise that the combination of government corruption and greater levels of exclusion correspond to high levels of violence as

individuals conclude that pacific alternatives are not feasible. Indeed, Karin Dyrstad and Solveig Hillesund contend that "grievances and low external political efficacy are both associated with a higher propensity to support violence, and the combination of the two is particularly powerful."[63] An exclusive political structure combined with the perception that little opportunity exists to address grievances will likely have a positive association with violence. Interestingly, the interaction is not significant and the coefficient on social exclusion is the largest out of all models.

Model 15 takes a slightly different approach by assessing the impact of social exclusion within non-OECD countries. It is feasible that countries that have relatively low levels of economic development or ranked lower on the Human Development Index will likely have citizens who are more supportive of political violence when facing high levels of exclusion. The interaction term in model 15, however, fails to reach any conventional significance level.

As a final sensitivity check, I focus my analysis on economic conditions and social spending. Model 16 includes an interaction between a country's employment rate and the nature of its public expenditures. In this case, it stands to reason that more equitable public spending amidst high levels of unemployment would help dampen potential support for terrorism. Interestingly, the included term does not appear to have any meaningful effect, while the significance and impact of social exclusion remains unchanged.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall the analysis appears to confirm the hypothesis that high levels of social exclusion within a state will increase the likelihood that individuals will accept terrorism as a justifiable means of achieving political objectives. I contend that this constitutes an important advancement in our collective understanding of the processes in which individuals may formulate their beliefs on terrorism. Previous research that focuses on broad national trends often fail to consider how such contextual factors impact individual-level beliefs. By recognizing the hierarchical structure, however, my analysis is able to exploit individual-level survey data while simultaneously incorporating macro-level sources.

My empirical results also yielded other interesting findings. First, the models provide a degree of support for the curvilinear relationship between regime type and political violence. Initial increases in democratization correspond to an increase in support for terrorism, but as a country continues to approach full democratization there is a decrease in individual-level support. That said, the magnitude of the effect of regime type is rather small when compared to other variables. Second, I obtain the rather unexpected result that higher levels of unemployment actually reduces individual support for terrorism. To be fair, other scholars have also obtained a negative coefficient but with varying levels of statistical significance and different outcomes of interest.[64] Finally, there appears to be little evidence to support the secondary hypothesis that the equitable distribution of public goods will reduce support for political violence. In all models, the variable failed to reach any meaningful level of significance.

The results of this study contain important implications in terms of national security policymaking. Although most research concurs that levels of democracy correlate with terrorism, it does not offer much specificity nor information when formulating concrete

policy. Altering the overall level of democracy is nonspecific and rather vague. Instead, by focusing on the social exclusion of particular groups from the political process, decision-makers can more accurately tailor policies that attenuate widespread acceptance of terrorism. Ensuring political participation and access to political resources may create a viable mechanism for groups to express their grievances. The longstanding assumption that enhancing institutional arrangements to allow greater levels of participation to mitigate violence appears to still hold true.

Recognition of individual-level attitudes toward political violence can also facilitate counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, Christopher Paul asserts that "attacking support continues to be a potentially effective policy lever" given that terrorist and insurgent groups are dependent upon some degree of popular support or, at the very least, complicit support.[65] Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins agree, noting that "societal support, whether implicit or explicit, is often a critical facilitator for terrorist organizations, allowing them to conduct operations more frequently and more easily."[66] Kirill Zhirkov, Maykel Verkuyten, and Jeroen Weesie conclude that "popular support for terrorism represents an important challenge for counterterrorism efforts, and understanding the causes and correlates of favorable attitudes toward terrorism can assist in formulating efficient policies."[67] Explicit recognition of socio-political exclusion may benefit both proactive and preventative counterterrorism efforts.

At the same time, my analysis suggests that attempts to achieve a more equitable distribution of public goods may not be the most effective means of reducing individual-level support for terrorism. Although equitable public spending may be normatively appealing, the undertaking is not likely to have a significant effect and diminishing returns may temper its efficacy. Indeed, Frances Stewart has pointed out that societal groups do not necessarily utilize resources at the same rate.[68] Additionally, the redistribution of socio-economic resources inherently faces a tradeoff with political freedoms which may foster its own set of grievances. This perspective admittedly stands in contrast, however, to other scholars who argue that social welfare policies can help to reduce levels of both international and domestic terrorism. For example, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks have suggested that welfare policies should be regarded as "helpful instruments for fighting terrorism."[69] Brian Burgoon has similarly argued that "social welfare policies – including social security, unemployment, and health and education spending – affect preferences and capacities of social actors in ways that, on balance, discourage terrorism."[70]

The contrast in empirical results suggests that further investigation may be warranted. To be sure, this article highlights several potential avenues for future research. For example, analysts should conduct additional surveys that differentiate the various types of terrorism considered acceptable by respondents. In particular, it may be that left-wing revolutionary terrorism is viewed as being justifiable when groups are excluded from the political process. Researchers should also study whether decreases in social exclusion correspond to a subsequent increase in right-wing reactionary terrorism. It could very well be the case that terrorism is justified by those in privileged positions fearful of an alteration to the status quo from which they benefit.[71] Indeed, Frances Stewart acknowledges that "the relatively privileged can also attack the underprivileged, fearing that they may demand more resources, and, especially, political power."[72] Gudrun

Østby concurs, arguing that those in privileged positions may utilize violence against the unprivileged, "fearing that they may demand more resources and political power, or they may even strive to secede."[73] It is therefore essential that future scholarship examine the impact of social exclusion as it may lead to either left-wing violence perpetrated by those who are deprived of access to political resources, or right-wing groups seeking to protect the status quo.

Finally, our collective knowledge would be greatly enhanced by future in-depth qualitative case studies that address the causality of social exclusion. Such qualitative research should also explore the extent to which social inequalities facilitate the mobilization and subsequent organization of domestic terrorist groups. Case studies that focus on the individual would ultimately yield valuable insight as to how those who believe terrorism is justified formulated their opinion.

This article sought to expand our collective understanding of the causes of terrorism by conducting a more rigorous empirical assessment of longstanding theories regarding socio-political exclusion and horizontal inequalities. It undertook a relatively novel approach by investigating how such contextual factors influence individual-level beliefs using multi-level analysis. This methodological procedure helps capture the multidimensional nature of the causes of terrorism by explicitly recognizing macro-micro linkages and the hierarchical structure of global society. I have argued that it is critical for analysts to better understand how broad national trends impact the beliefs of individuals. Doing so not only provides greater insight on the phenomenon of terrorism, but better informs counterterrorism policymaking.

Disclosure statement

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Notes

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Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77; Amélie Godefroidt and Arnim Langer, "How Fear Drives Us Apart: Explaining the Relationship between Terrorism and Social Trust," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 7 (2018): 1482–505. More recent studies confirm no statistical effect, see Erik Cruz, Stewart D'Alessio, and Lisa Stolzenberg, "The Labor Market and Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 43, no. 3 (2020): 224–38.

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Appendix

	Observations	Percent	Cumulative percent
Andorra (2018)	1,004	1.51	1.51
Argentina (2017)	1,003	1.51	3.01
Australia (2018)	1,813	2.72	5.73
Bangladesh (2018)	1,200	1.80	7.53
Bolivia (2017)	2,067	3.10	10.63
Brazil (2018)	1,762	2.64	13.28
Chile (2018)	1,000	1.50	14.78
China (2018)	3,036	4.56	19.33
Colombia (2018)	1,520	2.28	21.62
Cyprus (2019)	1,000	1.50	23.12
Ecuador (2018)	1,200	1.80	24.92
Egypt (2018)	1,200	1.80	26.72
Ethiopia (2020)	1,230	1.85	28.56
Germany (2018)	1,528	2.29	30.86
Greece (2017)	1,200	1.80	32.66
Guatemala (2020)	1,203	1.81	34.46
Indonesia (2018)	3,200	4.80	39.26
Iran (2020)	1,499	2.25	41.51
Iraq (2018)	1,200	1.80	43.31
Japan (2019)	1,353	2.03	45.34
Jordan (2018)	1,203	1.81	47.15
Kazakhstan (2018)	1,276	1.91	49.06
Kyrgyzstan (2020)	1,200	1.80	50.86
Lebanon (2018)	1,200	1.80	52.66
Malaysia (2018)	1,313	1.97	54.64
Mexico (2018)	1,739	2.61	57.24
Myanmar (2020)	1,200	1.80	59.05
New Zealand (2020)	1,057	1.59	60.63
Nicaragua (2019–2020)	1,200	1.80	62.43
Nigeria (2018)	1,237	1.86	64.29
Pakistan (2018)	1,995	2.99	67.28
Peru (2018)	1,400	2.10	69.38
Philippines (2019)	1,200	1.80	71.18
Romania (2018)	1,257	1.89	73.07
Russia (2017)	1,810	2.72	75.79
Serbia (2017)	1,046	1.57	77.36
South Korea (2018)	1,245	1.87	79.22
Taiwan ROC (2019)	1,223	1.84	81.06
Tajikistan (2020)	1,200	1.80	82.86
Thailand (2018)	1,500	2.25	85.11
Tunisia (2019)	1,208	1.81	86.92
Turkey (2018)	2,415	3.62	90.55
Ukraine (2020)	1,289	1.93	92.48
United States (2017)	2,596	3.90	96.38
Vietnam (2020)	1,200	1.80	98.18
Zimbabwe (2020)	1,215	1.82	100.00
Total	66,642	100.00	